The Delaware Chancery Court recently confirmed in Segway Inc v. Cai1 that to survive a motion to dismiss, a duty of oversight claim must satisfy the same exacting pleading standard irrespective of whether the defendant is a director or officer of the company.
In April 2015, Ninebot (Beijing) Tech Co., Ltd. acquired personal transportation device maker Segway, but the companies continued to operate separately. Segway maintained its own board, officers, and accounting and finance systems after the acquisition. Judy Cai became Segway’s vice president of finance in 2015, overseeing its daily operations. Cai then became Segway’s president in 2018 but continued to function as its in-house accountant, compiling and reviewing financial information for Ninebot.
Segway’s sales and customer base declined post-acquisition. It began focusing on Ninebot products and started downsizing its operations. By 2020, Segway had closed its headquarters and laid off most employees. After Cai’s employment terminated in November 2020, Ninebot allegedly uncovered a significant discrepancy in its accounts receivable. Ninebot could not reconcile the discrepancy, and Cai declined its requests for assistance.
Segway filed a single-count complaint against Cai alleging a breach of her fiduciary duty on December 2, 2022. Cai moved to dismiss, and Segway amended the complaint. The amended complaint likewise contained a breach of fiduciary duty claim—specifically, Cai’s oversight obligations, in reliance on the seminal Caremark2 case and its progeny, which had articulated the conditions for oversight liability.
Segway alleged Cai knew or should have known about potential issues involving certain Segway customers causing its accounts receivable to rise. It further claimed Cai breached her fiduciary duty as an officer by ignoring issues impacting its profitability and failing to otherwise alert the board or take remedial action. Cai moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
In analyzing Segway’s Caremark claim, Vice Chancellor Lori Will explained that oversight duties arise from the duty of good faith, which is subsumed within the duty of loyalty. Oversight liability, as articulated in Caremark and restated by Stone v. Ritter3, can be established where fiduciaries (1) “utterly fail to implement any reporting or information system or controls”, or (2) “having implemented such a system or controls, consciously fail to monitor or oversee its operations”, which disables them “from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention”4.
Segway argued it met the Caremark standard by relying on the Court’s recent decision in McDonald’s5, which extended to officers, for the first time, Caremark’s oversight duties. In McDonald’s, the vice chancellor observed that officers of Delaware corporations owe context-specific oversight duties comparable to those of directors but emphasized that the duty of oversight extended only to matters within their province, with limited exceptions.
Although Cai, as president of Segway, owed fiduciary duties to the company and its stockholders, whether she breached those duties, giving rise to a claim under either prong of the Caremark test, was unclear. The Court began by applying the McDonald’s framework, which requires that any alleged oversight violation must fall within Cai’s remit. The Court summarized Cai’s alleged job duties and allegations concerning her lack of oversight but found no potential wrongdoing, and certainly none within her purview. Because “generic financial matters are far from the sort of red flags that could give rise to Caremark liability if deliberately ignored”6, and because the complaint lacked any indicia of bad faith on Cai’s part, the Court granted Cai’s motion to dismiss on December 14, 2023.
In dismissing the action, the Court cautioned that oversight duties should not subject fiduciaries to personal liability for failure to accurately predict the future or evaluate business risk. Nor should the Caremark doctrine be used as a tool to hold fiduciaries liable for routine business problems. Rather, it is intended to address “the extraordinary case where fiduciaries’ ‘utter failure’ to implement an effective compliance system or ‘conscious disregard’ of the law gives rise to a corporate trauma”. The Court also addressed Segway’s misapprehension that an oversight claim against an officer is easier to plead than one against a director. It reiterated that “a Caremark claim is ‘possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment’. At a minimum, a plaintiff pursuing an oversight claim against an officer would need to demonstrate that the officer failed to make a good faith effort to monitor central compliance risks within her remit that pose potential harm to the company or others”7.
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